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COMMENT
The Sentence Imposed Versus the Statutory
Maximum: Repairing the Armed Career Criminal Act
Desmond Akil Smith was a twenty-two-year-old star offensive lineman on
the Clemson University football team. During his junior year, undercover
police officers caught him in a drug bust. In a two-week period, Smith sold
marijuana three times to undercover operatives within a half-mile of the
Clemson campus.' He pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing drugs near
a school.' Though each of those counts carried a maximum of ten years in
prison under South Carolina law,3 the judge sentenced Smith only to two
years' probation.4 But despite his mild sentence, Smith had committed at least
three "serious drug offenses" for purposes of the Federal Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA) because ACCA-predicate offenses are based upon
statutory maximum sentences.' If he were to buy and register a firearm at any
point in his life, he would become an "armed career criminal" under the ACCA
and would face a mandatory minimum of fifteen years in prison.6
In contrast to Smith, serious offenders often are not covered by the ACCA.
Mark Regopoulos, for example, was the "accused ringleader of a high-level
marijuana operation that was based out of a downtown ... pizza shop" near
1. Kimathi Lewis & Ken Tysiac, Star Clemson Players Face Felony Drug Counts, STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 5, 2001, at Ai.
2. Ken Tysiac, Zachery Receives Probation, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 28, 2002, at C2. Smith
also pleaded guilty to three counts of marijuana distribution. Id.
3. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-445 (2002).
4. Tysiac, supra note 2.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000).
6. Id. § 924(e)(1).
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Penn State.7 As part of a drug bust, Regopoulos was arrested and charged with
a dozen counts of drug-related crimes. He pleaded guilty to three felony counts
of delivering marijuana.8 Each count carried a maximum of five years in
prison.9 Regopoulos received 9 to 23.5 months.1° Yet because the maximum
sentence was five years rather than ten for each conviction, none of
Regopoulos's offenses constitute ACCA predicates; there is no chance that he
would find himself subject to the ACCA's fifteen-year mandatory minimum at
some point in the future.
This Comment argues that Congress should repair this defect by amending
the Armed Career Criminal Act to define the predicate "serious drug offenses"
and "violent felonies" by the sentence actually imposed rather than the
maximum an offender could have received." Making this adjustment would
ensure that our justice system imposes the most serious consequences on the
most culpable offenders, align the ACCA with deportation standards in
immigration law and with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and reduce the
practical difficulties that are built into the present system.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT
Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984 to address the growing threat to
society posed by armed, repeat criminals. The ACCA created a "new federal
crime" designed to keep "the most dangerous, frequent and hardened
offenders" off the streets. 2 The Act mandates a term of fifteen years to life for a
felon in possession of a firearm with three or more prior convictions for serious
crimes. 3 The fifteen-year term was designed to "incapacitate the armed career
7. Margaret Miceli, Gopper's Owner Takes Plea Deal, DAILY COLLEGIAN (State College, Pa.),
Jan. 31, 2OO8, at 1, available at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2oo8/o1/31/
goppers-owner takesplea-deal.aspx.
8. Id.
9. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-113(0(2) (West 2003).
1o. See Miceli, supra note 7.
11. This Comment does not suggest defining ACCA-predicate offenses by the prison time the
defendant actually served. A variety of issues unrelated to a defendant's culpability influence
the amount of time a defendant actually spends in jail. Many states, for example, have
responded to prison overcrowding by instituting controversial early release programs. See,
e.g., CAL. STATE SHERIFFS' ASS'N, JAIL OVERCROWDING REPORT (20o6),
http://www.calsheriffs.org/ legislative-jail overcrowding.htm.
12. S. REP. No. 97-585, at 5 (1982).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000).
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criminal for the rest of the normal time span of his career which usually starts
at about age 15 and continues to about age 30."
14
The ACCA's fifteen-year minimum is triggered if the defendant has three
or more prior convictions for drug distribution offenses or violent felonies.
Those so-called "predicate" crimes are defined in part by the longest prison
term a defendant could receive for committing the crime, regardless of the
sentence actually imposed.s To qualify as a "serious drug offense," for
example, the statute criminalizing the offense must prescribe a "maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more."16 A "violent felony" must be
"punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. ' 17 Importantly,
"the sentences imposed are immaterial."'8
Because the sole measure of the offense's seriousness is the maximum term
prescribed by law, some offenses that result in probation, low prison terms, or
concurrent sentences will trigger the ACCA while some offenses that result in
months or years of prison time will not.1 9 As a result, many dangerous
criminals cannot be charged under the ACCA, while some relatively minor
offenders can find themselves facing fifteen years to life.
II. AMENDING THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT TO RELY UPON
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
This Comment proposes amending the Armed Career Criminal Act to
redefine "serious drug offense[s]" and "violent felon[ies]" as offenses meeting
other ACCA requirements "for which a term of imprisonment of X months or
more has been imposed," where Xwould be some number of months. To avoid
narrowing the ACCA's scope, X would have to be lower than ten years for
serious drug offenses and lower than one year for violent felonies.2"
14. S. REP. No. 97-585, at 7.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2).
16. Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i).
17. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
18. S. REP. No. 97-585, at 9.
19. Compare United States v. Speakman, 33o F.3d 1o8o (8th Cit. 2003) (holding that three drug
sales totaling less than a gram of methamphetamine over less than one month triggered the
ACCA), with North Carolina v. Wilson, No. COAo4-112o, 2005 WL 2649164, at *1 (N.C.
Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2oo5) (punishing trafficking in 493.5 pounds of marijuana with thirty-five
to forty-two months in prison, but holding that this would not constitute an ACCA
predicate because the maximum penalty under North Carolina law was forty-two months).
2o. The current ACCA applies to offenders convicted of crimes that have maximum sentences of
ten years for serious drug offenses and one year for violent felonies. 18 U.S.C.
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A. Matching Consequences with Culpability
If the ACCA's application to an offender were based upon the imposed
term rather than on the maximum sentence defined by statute for the crime,
the ACCA would more accurately punish the most culpable offenders. To
obtain a conviction, a prosecutor must prove only the legal elements of the
crime. Those elements reflect state legislatures' judgments about the
seriousness of a criminal offense in the abstract. But for any particular crime, a
wide range of conduct may satisfy its statutory elements. Correspondingly, the
culpability of offenders who commit the same statutory offense may vary. An
Oregon college student caught selling two ounces of marijuana, for example,
could be charged under the same state law that criminalizes trafficking in four
tons of marijuana.2 As a result, the mere fact of a conviction often fails to
reveal whether a particular defendant is a hardened criminal.
In comparison to the fact of conviction, the length of an offender's sentence
is more correlated with his culpability, because sentencing proceedings often
take into account more detailed information about the offender's conduct. For
example, many states and the federal government determine the offender's
base score for sentencing by reference to the general crime he committed, but
then impose sentence enhancements based on factors such as the defendant's
criminal history, whether the offense was committed with a deadly weapon, or
whether the defendant's conduct was "sexually motivated."22 In other words,
§ 924(e)(2)(A)-(e)(2)(B). But far fewer offenders actually have sentences of those lengths
imposed upon them. Instead, convicted criminals often are sentenced to community service,
probation, or short prison terms. An offender found guilty in state court of a drug
trafficking offense, for example, will receive an average of sixty months in prison or seven
months in jail. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS
2004-STATISTICAL TABLES (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/
scscfo4/tables/scso41o3tab.htm. Thus, if the application of the ACCA relied upon an imposed
sentence of ten years for serious drug offenses and one year for violent felonies, fewer
criminals would be subject to the ACCA's penalties. This Comment does not take a firm
position on the correct value of X. Amending the ACCA to rely upon the sentence imposed
would not necessarily diminish the scope of the ACCA; that scope depends upon the value
that Congress would choose for X.
a. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.860 (2007).
22. See, e.g., ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2-26 (2007) (Washington), available at
http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/AdultManual/Manual_20o7_Section_IJJ.pdf; MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 2-24 (2OO8), available at
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guideo8.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.4 (2007); WISCONSIN SENTENCING GUIDELINES NOTES 2-5, available at
http://wsc.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=3297.
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while a trial coarsely determines guilt or innocence, the sentencing phase more
finely measures culpability and calibrates the sentence accordingly.
B. Aligning the Armed Career Criminal Act with Deportation Standards and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Our justice system already emphasizes the sentence imposed in other
contexts. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), for example, a
lawfully present alien is generally deportable if he has committed an
"aggravated felony."23 The INA defines some (but not all) aggravated felonies,
such as crimes of violence and theft offenses, by "the term of imprisonment." 4
Courts have interpreted that phrase to refer to the sentence imposed rather
than to the jail time the offender could have received."
Similarly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines use the sentence imposed
when computing sentence enhancements based on prior criminal history. For
example, defendants receive three criminal history points "for each prior adult
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month imposed within
fifteen years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense. ' ' 6 The
Guidelines Manual makes clear that "[t]o qualify as a sentence of
imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of
imprisonment on such sentence. '2 7 Unlike the ACCA, the Guidelines "equate
the severity of the prior offense with the length of the sentence imposed for the
previous conviction. '
23. 8 U.S.C. § n1 (a)(43) (listing and defining twenty-one categories of aggravated felonies).
24. Id. § n1o1(a)(43)(F) (defining "a crime of violence" under the statute as a violent crime
meeting other statutory requirements "for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one
year"); id. § ilol(a)(43)(G) (defining "a theft offense" under the statute as a theft meeting
other statutory requirements "for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year").
25. See, e.g., Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2002) ("We... interpret this phrase
to refer to the term of imprisonment that is actually imposed and not to the statutory
minimum....").
26. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, WORKSHEETS FOR INDIVIDUALS, at worksheet C (2008), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/training/worksheets-o3o8.pdf.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 cmt. 2 (2007); see also id. S 4A1.2(a)(1) ("The
term 'prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of
guilt .... (emphasis added)).
28. Michael Edmund O'Neill, Abraham's Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of (Nearly) First-Time
Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 304 (2001).
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The ACCA should employ the same framework that is applied in
deportation proceedings and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.29 In all three
contexts, the justice system imposes consequences based on the offender's
culpability and future dangerousness. Bringing all three areas into alignment
would benefit prosecutors, judges, and defendants by making sentencing
proceedings more consistent and predictable.
C. Reducing Practical Difficulties
Aligning the ACCA with immigration law and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines would reduce practical difficulties and simplify theoretical
complexities that are built into the present system. The Supreme Court
recently decided in Rodriquez v. United States that the "maximum term of
imprisonment prescribed by law" must be computed with reference to state
repeat offender laws in addition to the statute of conviction." Now, lawyers
and federal judges must search through state statutes to find state recidivist
laws that would increase the maximum sentence prescribed by law. These
searches are particularly difficult when state recidivist enhancements have not
already been applied; in those cases, judges must figure out whether the repeat
offender statute could have made the defendant eligible for an enhanced term.
That inquiry therefore requires federal courts to answer complicated, unsettled
questions of state law and to resolve factual issues about crimes committed
decades in the past.
Many state repeat offender statutes, for example, allow convictions in out-
of-state jurisdictions to count as predicate offenses if they are "substantially
similar" to offenses that would count as predicates under the home state's
laws.3 In People v. McGee, California courts had "to determine whether [a
Nevada robbery] conviction ... qualifies as a conviction under [California
law]."32 Answering that question required "a factual determination about [the]
29. This Comment should acknowledge, however, that at least one other federal statute, the
Controlled Substances Act, employs a "maximum term of imprisonment" approach. See 21
U.S.C. § 802(44) (defining a "felony drug offense" as an offense "that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or
foreign country"). While this Comment confines its argument to the ACCA, Congress
might be wise to amend the Controlled Substances Act to achieve greater uniformity in the
sentencing system.
30. 128 S. Ct. 1783, 1786 (2008).
31. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/ 5- 5- 3.2(b)(1) (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15A-1340.14(e) (West 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4o-35-1o7(b) (5) (West 2003).
32. 133 P. 3d 1054, 1062 (Cal. 2oo6).
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criminal defendant's intent, '"" which could only be made after a thorough
review of the record-a difficult task even for a state court. After Rodriquez,
such questions must be resolved by federal courts as a matter of first
impression.
Relying upon the sentence imposed to calculate ACCA sentence
enhancements would make the search for state recidivist laws unnecessary. In
trials ending with a jury verdict, the imposed sentence is readily available from
basic court documents. In Wisconsin, for example, judges simply fill in the
blank space on a standard form that reads: "IT IS ADJUDGED that the
defendant is guilty as convicted and ... is sentenced to prison for __,34
Similarly, court forms in the State of Washington contain the sentence length
on their face.35 Plea bargaining agreements also clearly report the sentence
length. 6 Thus, if the application of the ACCA was based upon the sentence
imposed instead of the maximum sentence prescribed by law, complex searches
through state statute books and inquiries into the facts of crimes committed
years ago would be replaced by a simple glance at the record.
Because using the sentence imposed would simplify the court's task, it does
not implicate the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor
v. United States.3" In Taylor, fearing a quagmire of "evidentiary disputes" and
"collateral trials," the Court refused to allow federal courts to look beyond the
fact of conviction and the statute defining the prior offense when applying the
ACCA. 8 To preserve scarce judicial resources, courts are generally prohibited
from looking to the underlying trial record; the statutory text must be treated
as conclusive.39 But Taylor's concerns with judicial economy are not applicable
here. In this context, using the imposed prison term would promote judicial
economy by avoiding the type of evidentiary disputes about which the Taylor
Court was concerned.4 °
33. People v. McGee, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 586, 597 (Ct. App. 2004).
34. STATE OF WIS., JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE (2007), available at
http ://www.wicourts.gov/forms/CR-212.pdf.
35. See, e.g., SUPERIOR COURT OF WASH., JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE § 4.5 (2000), available at
http://www.j in.wa.gov/standards/justiceCommonArchitecture/appendixc.doc.
36. See, e.g., RULES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLA., UNIFORM PLEA OF GUILTY,
PART B: SENTENCE ON PLEA 9 (20o8), available at http://www.occa.state.ok.us/
forms/Form%2013.Ao.doc.
37. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
38. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 23 (2005) (discussing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 6Ol).
39. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02.
40. Supreme Court case law carves out a much-criticized exception to the Sixth Amendment's
trial by jury requirement for the fact of a prior conviction. See Almendarez-Torres v. United
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III. SENTENCING DISPARITIES: A DRAWBACK OF RELYING UPON
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
Despite the advantages of the approach discussed above, this Comment's
recommendation could cause the ACCA to magnify disparities already inherent
in sentencing. Studies have shown that race, gender, and age, among other
arbitrary factors, are correlated with sentence length.4' Amending the ACCA to
rely upon sentencing decisions that exhibit these disparities might simply
replace one evil with another.
Many racial or other disparities in sentencing, however, may be the product
of bias that was present only at the trial phase.42 In such cases, those disparities
will exist regardless of whether the ACCA uses the sentence imposed or the
statutory maximum, because both the fact of a defendant's conviction for a
crime with a particular statutory maximum and his resulting sentence may
have been influenced by the biased trial. Furthermore, in recent years, state and
federal justice systems have increasingly used sentencing guidelines to
constrain judicial discretion,43 making it more difficult for bias to infiltrate
sentencing. Indeed, state sentencing guidelines "are popular because they have
proven more effective than alternative sentencing regimes as a means to
promote consistency and fairness." 44 A recent report on sentencing concluded
that "[t]he track record of state guideline systems in the domain of race and
sentencing has been one of marginal but apparently positive effects." 45 Basing
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998). If that case is overruled, this Comment's recommendation
would not be affected; the question of the length of the imposed term would merely have to
be submitted to a jury rather than to a judge.
41. See, e.g., COMM. ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE Sys., FINAL REPORT OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 125-62 (2003), available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/lNDEX/supreme/
BiasCmte/ FinalReport.chi.pdf.
42. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era ofMandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 74-75 (2003) (discussing jury racial bias).
43. See id. at 34; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 106-o9 (2006) (concluding that although
"demographic factors are associated with sentence length ... their contribution to sentence
lengths before and after Booker are identical"), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker report/Booker_.Report.pdf.
44. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy
Issues, 1O5 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 , 1192 (2005).
45. Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6
BUFF. CRim. L. REv. 525, 586 (2002).
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the application of the ACCA upon the imposed sentence would be a vote of
confidence for these improving state sentencing regimes.
46
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLES OF PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES
Basing the application of the ACCA upon the sentence imposed would
affect the plea bargaining relationship between prosecutors and defendants
even before the defendant is charged under the ACCA. This effect would most
likely magnify the role of judges and reduce prosecutorial power during plea
bargaining. The current version of the ACCA encourages defendants to plead
guilty to a lesser offense with a lower maximum prison term. Prosecutors enjoy
unreviewable discretion when choosing which charges to pursue.47 Thus the
ACCA's current structure strengthens the prosecutor's role by allowing him to
threaten a defendant with an ACCA-predicate conviction. Using the sentence
imposed, on the other hand, would refocus the bargaining (at the margins) on
the actual prison term rather than on the charged offense itself. This change
would transfer some power from prosecutors to judges, who have more control
over sentences imposed.
To be sure, the prosecutor's initial charging decision will continue to play
an important role in determining the sentence imposed due to the existence of
sentencing guidelines that limit judicial discretion, among other factors. 4s But
in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington,4" which
weakened mandatory state sentencing regimes, state judges retain substantial
sentencing discretion. If the ACCA is amended to use the sentence imposed,
state judges will likely play a more important role in determining which
offenders can be charged under the ACCA.
46. Recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that the Sixth Amendment trial by jury
requirement applies to state and federal sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). To some degree, those
holdings obstruct the guidelines' goal of reducing sentencing disparities.
47. See Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators' Privilege and Innocents' Refuge: A New Approach to Joint
Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 146o (2002).
48. Id. State sentencing guidelines, however, are more flexible than the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which "try to structure and define every single decision." Richard S. Frase, Is
Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425,
426 (2000). State judges, therefore, retain greater discretion than federal judges to influence
the sentence imposed. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH 210-12 (2003).
49. 542 U.S. 296.
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While the issues raised by altering the balance of power between
prosecutors and judges are complex," ° this Comment cautiously suggests that a
shift of power from prosecutors to judges at the margins is desirable.
Prosecutors' charging decisions are not regulated by statute;"1 by contrast, state
judges rely on sentencing commissions that include "judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, correctional officials, public members, and sometimes
legislators.""2 The composition of these sentencing commissions may provide
some democratic legitimacy to a judge's sentencing decisions.5 3 Moreover,
shifting power from prosecutors to judges would promote transparency. While
plea bargains often are negotiated in a back room hidden from public view, a
judge's sentencing decision is handed down in open court.
CONCLUSION
The Armed Career Criminal Act does not adequately distinguish hard-core,
repeat criminals from relatively minor offenders. By focusing on the maximum
term of imprisonment prescribed by law for prior offenses rather than on the
actual sentence imposed, the ACCA allows many dangerous, recidivist
criminals to escape its grasp and tolerates inequitable sentencing decisions.
Amending the ACCA to rely on the actual term imposed would ensure that the
most hardened offenders receive the longest sentences, bring the ACCA into
line with deportation standards in immigration law and with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and simplify the work of prosecutors, judges, and
defense lawyers.
ETHAN DAVIS
50. For a thorough discussion of some of these issues, see FISHER, supra note 48, at 205-30.
51. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
52. Frase, supra note 44, at 1197.
53. To be sure, state prosecutors are often democratically elected officials while not all state
judges are elected. See Carol S. Steiker, Death, Taxes, and-Punishment? A Response to
Braithwaite and Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1798 (1999).
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